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In his article entitled ‘Aufbau/Bauhaus’ and related work, Peter Galison explores the connections
between the Vienna Circle and the Dessau Bauhaus. Historically, these groups were related, with
members of each group familiar with the ideas of the other. Galison argues that their projects are
related as well, through shared political views and methodological approach. The two main ﬁgures
that connect the Vienna Circle to the Bauhaus—and the ﬁgures upon which Galison focuses—are
Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath. Yet, in our view, the connections that Galison develops do
not properly capture the common themes between the Bauhaus and Neurath’s philosophical pro-
jects. In this paper, we will examine a few of the historical connections between the Dessau Bauhaus
and the Vienna Circle, as well as the philosophical connections that Galison draws between these two
groups. By examining in greater depth Neurath’s philosophical commitments, we aim to demon-
strate that some of these philosophical connections fail to resonate with Neurath’s projects. And,
ﬁnally, we develop diﬀerent connections between Neurath’s projects and the Bauhaus. In our view,
these new connections between Neurath and the Dessau Bauhaus are both substantive and philo-
sophically interesting.
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1.1. The Dessau Bauhaus
On April 1, 1925, Walter Gropius’s Bauhaus school was turned out of Weimar, and it
was reopened that autumn in Dessau. Negotiations between the school and the Weimar
government had failed, and the government of Dessau promised the Bauhaus an entire
group of school buildings which Gropius himself would be able to design. It was in Des-
sau, then, during the last half of the 1920s, that the Bauhaus took a particular intellectual
turn, one reﬂective of a general trend in architecture at the time. Indeed, Galison points
out that one of the factors inﬂuencing this change was the Dutch De Stijl group, which
found the Weimar Bauhaus overly decorative and individualistic (Galison, 1990, p. 715;
Willett, 1978, p. 81).
Another precipitator of this turn must have been the industrial environment in Dessau
itself. Even before the move to Dessau, the Bauhaus had been associated with large scale
housing projects and, in particular, with mass accommodation for workers. But Dessau
was principally an industrial city, and the strong technological inﬂuence due to its large
manufacturing plants and factories must have been palpable. The new school buildings
designed for the Bauhaus reﬂected this inﬂuence. The school was grouped in several asym-
metrical blocks, with glass-curtained workshops and teachers’ houses equipped with new
domestic devices to increase eﬃciency. Such design ideals fell under the new Bauhaus con-
cept of ‘Art and Technology - a new unity’ (Willett, 1978, pp.118–119). A few years after
the school’s move to Dessau, Gropius was involved in the design and construction of a
large estate just south of the city. Even the process of building this complex of houses
reﬂected careful, rational planning, as well as the use of technological advances, such as
the on-site preparation of breezeblocks and concrete beams.
We can see these values expressed by Gropius in a sheet entitled ‘Dessau Bauhaus—
principles of Bauhaus production’, published in 1926:Only by constant contact with advanced technology, with the diversity of new mate-
rials and with new methods of construction, is the creative individual able to bring
objects into a vital relationship with the past, and to develop from that a new atti-
tude to design, namely:
Determined acceptance of the living environment of vehicles and machines.
Organic design of objects in terms of their own laws and determined by their contem-
poraneity, without Romantic beautiﬁcation and whimsy.
Exclusive use of primary forms and colours comprehensible to everyone.
Simplicity in multiplicity, economical use of space, material, time, and money.
The creation of standard types for all objects in daily use is a social necessity.
For most people the necessities of life are the same. The home, its furnishings, and
equipment are required by everybody, and their design is more a matter of reason
than of passion. (Reproduced in Whitford, 1984, p. 206)This outlook led to the decision that every house on the estate would be virtually identi-
cal. Since the only purpose of a house is to meet the living requirements of its inhabitants,
and most individuals have similar living requirements, there is no need to emphasize indi-
viduality in the construction of houses. For the houses of individuals whose requirements
are the same ought also to be the same. One could look at building as a way of facilitating
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other requirements. These buildings do not need any embellishments which do not serve bet-
ter to ensure the fulﬁllment of those requirements (Gropius & Schultze-Naumberg, 1994).
In 1928, Gropius resigned from the directorship of the Bauhaus, naming Hannes Meyer
as his successor. Meyer possessed many of the same ideals as Gropius, but was more polit-
ically active and wanted to bring the school’s activities into even closer alignment with
everyday life. Meyer believed that the school had become too inbred and too concerned
with its own particular style. For that reason, he wanted to direct it towards ‘popular
necessities’, rather than luxuries like paintings and decorative wallpaper. This shift in focus
was intended to ‘wean it away from idealism to ‘‘the one reality we control: that which can
be measured, seen, weighed’’’ (Willett, 1978, p. 123).
Another change eﬀected by Meyer in early 1929 was the practice of bringing in guest
lecturers in subjects such as philosophy and the social sciences. On October 15, 1929,
Rudolf Carnap gave a lecture at the Bauhaus in Dessau, having recently ﬁnished his book,
Der logische Aufbau der Welt, or The logical construction of the world. This book came to
be seen as representative of the Vienna Circle, an intellectual group of which Carnap was a
key member. The title of Carnap’s lecture at the Bauhaus was ‘Wissenschaft und Leben’
(‘Science and life’), and he addressed the audience with the statement, ‘I work in science,
and you in visible forms; the two are only diﬀerent sides of a single life’ (Galison, 1990, p.
710).
1.2. Carnap, Neurath, Bauhaus
Carnap was a logician, mathematical physicist and philosopher who studied logic and
philosophy under Frege and Bruno Bauch at the University of Jena. In 1924, Carnap was
introduced by Hans Reichenbach to Moritz Schlick, who was at the time a professor in
Vienna. Carnap visited the Schlick Circle several times, presenting an early version of
his Aufbau to members of the Circle. Soon after, Schlick and Hahn secured a position
for Carnap at the University in Vienna, where he lived from 1926 until 1931, and where
he continued to work on his Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Carnap, 1963; Geier, 1998).
The philosophical task of this work is often characterized as the reconstruction of the
entire sensible world out of simple perceptual elements. This reconstruction leads to a con-
ception of the world adequate for the development of science.
In Galison’s view, the term Aufbau had a very speciﬁc cultural meaning at the time Car-
nap was writing, which Galison refers to as the ‘left-technocratic’ period of interest in the
notion of Aufbau. Generally, Galison takes Aufbau to be a process of reconstruction or
rebuilding, though on his view neither of these words fully captures the meaning of the
German word. In the left-technocratic period in particular, Galison takes the idea of
the reconstruction to be as follows:On new, and for the ﬁrst time ﬁrm, foundations, they would erect a political, philo-
sophical, and aesthetic world separate from everything that had come before. It
would (in most instances) be socialist, internationalist, practical, and deeply scientiﬁc
and technological. (Galison, 1996, p. 17)So we ought to think of Aufbau as related to the reformation of life and a restructuring of
values away from the traditional. In this historical period in particular, Aufbau meant a
shift away from the merely decorative and superﬂuous and toward the practical, in order
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nocratic meaning of Aufbau—its primarily social and political signiﬁcance.
Carnap had just such a left-technocratic inclination, for he was identiﬁed with the neue
Sachlichkeit cultural movement, which was committed to internationalism, some version
of socialism, and the use of technology to aid in the organization of public life.1 Carnap,
however, was not as politically involved as another key member of the Vienna Circle—
Otto Neurath. Neurath was an economist, active in education and in left-wing politics.
He had served as president of the Central Economic Administration in Bavaria after its
socialist revolution and had also developed a system of picture statistics, known as ISO-
TYPE (International System Of TYpographic Picture Education), for use in museums.
Neurath was keenly interested in the housing projects in which the Bauhaus was involved,
and he was very pleased by the school’s gradual shift towards a more scientiﬁc, practical,
and technological education.
Neurath was present at the opening of the new Dessau Bauhaus in 1926. He wrote an
article commemorating the occasion called ‘Das Neue Bauhaus in Dessau’ (‘The New Bau-
haus in Dessau’), which was published in a journal also entitled Der Aufbau. His reaction
to the new orientation of the Bauhaus looks somewhat similar to Meyer’s criticism of the
Bauhaus some years later. As Galison summarizes Neurath’s article:1 See
termsCelebrating the renunciation of ornamentation and decoration of every sort, he
gently chided the Bauhaus for relying too much on the style of modernism and
not suﬃciently on its practical implications: ‘When will the modern engineers run
the Bauhaus?’ (1990, p. 716)After Meyer took over the directorship, the logical positivists came often to speak at the
Bauhaus. In July 1929, Herbert Feigl spent a week at the school as the oﬃcial representa-
tive of the Vienna Circle, and we have already mentioned Carnap’s lecture in October of
that same year. Neurath lectured there several times as well, both in 1929 and in 1930.
In his article ‘Aufbau/Bauhaus’, and also in ‘Constructing modernism: Cultural loca-
tion of Aufbau’, Galison explores the connections between the Vienna Circle and the Bau-
haus. As Carnap said during his lecture at the Bauhaus, science and the visual forms were
supposed to be two sides of a single life. So it is worth seeing what the Vienna Circle and
the Bauhaus took to be the connections between the two. The particular connections Gali-
son takes himself to be investigating are related to the cultural meaning of the term Auf-
bau. Galison writes:in the German-speaking world during the 1920s, a vocabulary and reservoir of
images evolved that were shared by both the positivists and the Bauha¨usler. This
repository included a notion of transparent construction in which each element
had its place and function. It included the aspiration of both groups to harmonize
their own discipline (and interior life more generally) with the rationalism each
saw embodied in what they perceived as the regularity, intelligibility, and function-
ality of contemporary technology. It included an emphasis on the role of the collec-
tive action of peoples. (Galison, 1996, p. 41)Friedman (1996, pp. 50–51). For more on the connection between the Vienna Circle and the Bauhaus in
of the neue Sachlichkeit, see Dahms (2004).
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in virtue of the groups’ similar goals, goals connected to the particular notion of Aufbau
then in play.
In the paragraph quoted above, we can in fact distinguish two meanings of Aufbau. The
ﬁrst is a more general cultural meaning, what we have been calling the left-technocratic
meaning of Aufbau. This is related to the idea of modernism and the use of technology
to help create a rationally ordered form of life. The second meaning, however, is more
directly related to the title of Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt. This notion, which
we will refer to as the procedural meaning of Aufbau, is the idea of a transparent construc-
tion from simple elements. It is important that the left-technocratic and procedural mean-
ings be kept distinct, for reasons that will be made clear below.
That the left-technocratic meaning of Aufbau can be used to link Carnap and Neurath
with the Bauhaus is quite clear. Carnap and Neurath are often said to be part of the ‘Left
Vienna Circle,’ taken as a political designation. And both the Bauhaus and the Left
Vienna Circle had the same political enemies: ‘the religious right, nationalist, anthropos-
ophist, vo¨lkisch, and Nazi opponents’ (Galison, 1990, p. 710), the opposition to which nat-
urally drew them together. The geometrical style of the Bauhaus was particularly criticized
by the Nazis as being too ‘international’. For instance, their ﬂat geometrical roofs were not
seen to be appropriate for northern climates, and were considered too ‘oriental’. In gen-
eral, this geometrical style was thought to be incapable of capturing the ‘German essence’,
or any kind of nationalistic spirit.
Members of the Vienna Circle denied the possibility of a ‘German essence’ even more
explicitly than the Bauhaus. Even Schlick—one of the less left-wing members of the
Vienna Circle—explicitly opposed the idea of the Deutschtum, Nation, or Volk having
any kind of transcendent reality (ibid., p. 744). So unsurprisingly, many Vienna Circle aca-
demics and their intellectual allies found themselves in a very diﬃcult position with the rise
of Nazism. Neurath wrote to Carnap several times in 1933, describing the atmosphere of
desperation in Vienna, recalling those he knew who had already been arrested, or even
killed. Everyone he knew, he wrote, was trying to escape (ibid., pp. 744–745). Carnap
had already left for Prague two years earlier, and in 1935, he ﬂed Europe altogether. Most
members of the Vienna Circle did similarly.
Galison is certainly sensitive to the relevance of the left-technocratic meaning of Aufbau
to both the Vienna Circle and the Bauhaus. However, particularly in ‘Aufbau/Bauhaus’,
he emphasizes the procedural meaning of Aufbau as a means of connecting the Vienna Cir-
cle and the Bauhaus. He takes this connection to exist between the Bauhaus philosophy
and that of Carnap and Neurath in particular. More speciﬁcally, Galison relates the type
of constructive project in which Carnap is engaged in the Aufbau to the architectural meth-
odology of the Bauhaus. He writes:Both enterprises sought to instantiate a modernism emphasizing what I will call
‘transparent construction’, a manifest building up from simple elements to all higher
forms that would, by virtue of the systematic constructional program itself, guaran-
tee the exclusion of the decorative, mystical, or metaphysical. (Ibid., p. 710)On the Bauhaus side of this connection, Galison cites the use of basic geometrical
forms, as well as the use of glass ﬁxtures which made visible the inner workings of
the lamp. He also cites Bauhaus teachers like Kandinsky on their notions regarding
form:
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complicated ones. Hence, in the ﬁrst part of the investigation of form the plane is
reduced to three fundamental elements—triangle, square, and circle—and space is
reduced to the resulting fundamental space elements—pyramid, cube, and sphere.
(Ibid., p. 738)Thus constructed from basic elements, nothing merely decorative could possibly ﬁnd its
way into the work.
On the Vienna Circle side of this connection, Galison cites Carnap’s Aufbau as repre-
sentative of the Vienna Circle’s ‘scientiﬁc world-conception’. An early version of this view
also appears in the Vienna Circle’s manifesto, their Wissenschaftliche Weltaufassung, to
which both Carnap and Neurath contributed (Hahn et al., 1929). Galison points out
the empiricist commitments of this work, that the only source of knowledge is experience
and, in particular, the immediately given. The Vienna Circle divided statements into two
categories, the ﬁrst being those of empirical science, the meaning of which can be deter-
mined through the method of logical analysis, while the second class of statements are
the meaningless statements of metaphysics. Naturally, the latter have no place in scientiﬁc
philosophy.
Furthermore, Galison takes the Vienna Circle’s interest in the logical analysis of science
to have the goal of ‘[reaching] a uniﬁed science by ‘‘constituting’’ all scientiﬁc theories out
of the elementary bits of perception’ (Galison, 1990, p. 732). By this kind of construction,
that is, out of only those basic elements which are immediately given, nothing metaphys-
ical could ﬁnd its way into science. Just as the form of a glass lamp is to be transparent and
free of the ornate and decorative, the form of such a uniﬁed science is to be transparent as
well, free of the metaphysical.
Carnap is not the only one with strong intellectual connections to the Bauhaus. When
Meyer resigned his directorship of the Dessau Bauhaus under pressure from the Nazis, his
letter of protest included a list of his accomplishments. Among these was the list of visitors
whom he had brought to the Bauhaus, and Neurath’s name appears ﬁrst on the list (ibid.,
p. 745). And in ‘Aufbau/Bauhaus’, Galison takes Neurath’s physicalism to be something
akin to the construction process of Carnap’s Aufbau. Neurath’s physicalism is, according
to Galison, ‘[his] doctrine of building up from simple elements of experience’ (ibid., p.
746).
So Galison takes the Vienna Circle’s empiricist commitments, Carnap’s method of log-
ical analysis to the end of unifying science, and Neurath’s physicalism to evoke the proce-
dural meaning of Aufbau. In this philosophical context, this procedural meaning involves
the epistemological construction out of simple perceptual elements. For Galison, this is
analogous to the constructivist curriculum of the Bauhaus, exempliﬁed by Kandinsky,
which emphasizes architectural construction out of simple geometrical elements. The care-
ful nature of these constructions was intended to ensure that no metaphysical or decora-
tive elements found their way into that which was being constructed, so that the inner
workings of the structure would be transparent.2. Neurath’s philosophy of science
Above we detailed the connection that Galison draws between the Bauhaus and the
Vienna Circle and, in particular, the relevance of the procedural meaning of Aufbau to
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icism as ‘logistically fortiﬁed traditional foundationalism’2 fails to capture the nuanced
philosophical views of the Vienna Circle. Galison may not have such a caricature in
mind—the notion of transparent construction does not in itself seem to be a commitment
to foundationalism. Yet it is worth investigating the degree to which the philosophical
commitments that Galison takes to constitute the Vienna Circle’s connection to the Bau-
haus are themselves truly shared by the members of the Circle, and in particular by Neu-
rath. For in our view, it is at least the case that the project of transparent construction
from simple elements did not belong to Neurath.
Here we outline some of Neurath’s views on epistemology and philosophy of science.
The picture that emerges is clearly distinct from the stereotypical version of logical empir-
icism. A discussion of Neurath’s account of uniﬁed science will serve to ground his notion
of the role in science played by what he calls Ballungen, as well as his epistemological views
and, ﬁnally, Neurath’s peculiar form of physicalism. This investigation into Neurath’s
philosophical commitments will serve to ground our claim that the connection between
the Bauhaus and Neurath cannot have a basis in their shared commitment to the proce-
dural meaning of Aufbau, for at least with regards to his philosophical views, Neurath
had no such commitment.
2.1. Uniﬁed science and encyclopedism
Working toward a uniﬁed science (Einheitswissenschaft), especially through his encyclo-
pedia project, was a central and permanent aim of Neurath’s philosophical engagement.
Our phrasing is deliberate: Neurath saw this more as a project to be pursued than as a
philosophical stance. Uniﬁed science is not the instantiation of a ‘grand metaphysical
view’. Rather:2 Thinstead of aiming at a synthesis of the diﬀerent sciences on the basis of a prior and
independent philosophy, the special sciences will themselves supply their own synthe-
sizing glue. (Neurath, 1983f, p. 172)Thus uniﬁed science was a practical aim, namely the bringing together of scientists and
thereby distinct sciences in the name of interconnection and communication. What the
product of this collaboration would look like was not for Neurath or anyone else to
stipulate.
Neurath makes the same point in other places by distinguishing between a system and
systematization. The former is prescriptive, aiming for completion and correctness. Sys-
tematization, in contrast, yields an encyclopedia. And an encyclopedia is nothing but ‘a
preliminary assemblage of knowledge . . . the totality of scientiﬁc matter now at our dis-
posal’ (Neurath, 1983c, p. 146). The systematization of science, in Neurath’s sense, begins
with simply the bringing together of diverse scientiﬁc endeavors. Later, Neurath follows
Kallen in describing this process of systematization as ‘orchestration’ (Neurath, 1983g,
p. 242).
In what, though, does this systematization consist? One goal is the uniﬁcation of scien-
tiﬁc language, that is, ensuring that terminology and symbolism is as consistent as possible
among all disciplines. Note that by this Neurath does not mean that all sciences will beis phrasing comes from Uebel (1992, p. ix).
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will have to refrain . . . from concealing the ambiguity of certain pronouncements and from
attempting to design a unitary system’ (Neurath, 1983e, p. 140). Yet he does have in mind
a basic terminology that can be used in all of the sciences; more will be said regarding this
in Section 2.2 below.
Second, uniﬁed science should aim for and emphasize the unity of auxiliary procedures.
This includes detailing the stock of scientiﬁc instruments available and shown to be eﬀec-
tive, including ‘logical instruments’ such as probability theory (ibid., pp. 141, 155). Relat-
edly, Neurath aims for unity in graphic representation. As he puts it, ‘curves and other
ﬁgures are also instruments of scientiﬁc expression’ (ibid., p. 142). Neurath had in mind
that the ISOTYPE picture language that he had developed would provide the standardized
elements from which scientiﬁc ﬁgures could be constructed.
As far as the subject matter of the various sciences is concerned, Neurath writes that ‘of
greatest importance also is the linking of disciplines among themselves by the establish-
ment of ‘‘cross-connections’’’ (1983c, p. 155). Neurath provides an example of such a
cross-connection by posing the question, ‘to what degree can biology and physics be pre-
sented from a uniﬁed point of view?’ (ibid.). Further, cross-connections are forced upon us
by the application of scientiﬁc tools to particular problems. Neurath writes:We avoid pseudo-problems of all kinds if, in the analysis of sciences, we set out from
predictions, their formulation and their control. But it is precisely this starting point
that is little suited for the delimitation of special disciplines. One does not arrive at
individual disciplines of stars, stones, plants, animals during the deduction of certain
predictions, because time and again the conjunction of statements of diﬀerent origin
becomes necessary. (1983d, p. 132)Thus the working of science itself forces upon us connections among the individual parts
of science. This is because predicting and accounting for phenomena in the natural and
social world requires us to put to work many sciences simultaneously and in conjunction.
This can be seen as the impetus for the uniﬁed vocabulary, instrumentation, representation
of science, as well as the cross-connections among its parts. In short, science’s applicability
creates the need for its systematization.
The unity of science thesis is often characterized as the reduction of all sciences to the
domain of microphysics. Yet it is obvious that Neurath’s vision of uniﬁed science is far
from that. According to Neurath, the sciences themselves are to dictate their interconnec-
tions, and many diﬀerent systematizations are possible. The result is ‘a far-reaching unity
that can not be deduced logically’ (Neurath, 1983b, p. 116; emphasis in original). Thus,
uniﬁed science is a systematization of the language, procedures, and representations of sci-
ence in order to increase our ability to generate good predictions. Diﬀerent such system-
atizations are possible, and we are to take our lead from scientiﬁc practice itself. Neurath
says:The unity we have before us, as a goal for the encyclopedism of logical empiricism, is
based on the actual store of expressions which people have in common all over the
world. Its evolution would be based on conventions which could never be deﬁnite or
authoritative as far as the aspirations of conscientious logical empiricists are con-
cerned. Pluralism is the aura of this scientiﬁc world community of the common
man. The encyclopedism of logical empiricism . . . with the uniﬁed science encyclope-
3 Th
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with no philosophy, and is anti-totalitarian through and through. (Neurath, 1983g,
p. 242)2.2. Ballungen
We said above that Neurath’s notion of uniﬁed science includes the unity of the lan-
guage of science. He envisions a basic terminology that is applicable throughout science.
Yet, as we noted, this terminological unity will not bring the end of ambiguity; far from it.
Indeed, it is just this ambiguity that ensures the stability of discourse across times and
places and speakers. Such stability is necessary for scientiﬁc discourse, as well as for the
wide, borderless participation in science envisioned by Neurath.
Neurath takes as an example of this stabilizing ambiguity the sentence, ‘In a certain
year B.C. a ship moved up the waters of the Tiber in the direction of Rome’. He points
out thatThe terms of this statement can be used today in about the same way as some cen-
turies ago, although what corresponds in science to the common term ‘water’ has
today a deﬁnition that is diﬀerent from that of some centuries ago and even of a very
short time ago when one did not know the diﬀerence between ‘heavy’ and ‘light’
water. The terms of science must adapt themselves much more to the new theories
than a cluster. (Neurath, 1983c, p. 149)The very ambiguity of such Ballungen, or conglomerations, makes possible the reinterpre-
tation and translation that allows their stability. Thus terms from ordinary life such as
‘water’, ‘tree’, and ‘cave’ hold their meaning across cultures and among individuals much
more successfully than theoretical terms (be they magical, theological, metaphysical, or
scientiﬁc) such as ‘taboo’, ‘nirvana’, ‘thing in itself’, and ‘heat’.3
Yet Ballungen have their drawbacks. For their ambiguity and lack of theoretical com-
mitment make them ill-suited to oﬀer ﬁrm, scientiﬁc predictions. We need theoretical terms
to generate scientiﬁc progress, and the precise formulation of the concepts to which they
apply is very important. Yet there will always be a base of commonsense notions ground-
ing theoretical constructs. We cannot eliminate Ballungen, and it would be the death of
scientiﬁc progress—and communication—if we could. Thus:Our whole life consists in two opposite movements: in the one we tend to acquire
always new concepts and to modify those that tradition has left us; but in the other
we are obliged to take the traditional statements as the basis for our departure.
(Ibid., p. 150)Ambiguity and the resulting stability are thus opposed to precision and the resulting pre-
dictive power. Simple observation statements are the common currency in science and in
life, while theoretical terminology yields predictions and can lead to scientiﬁc progress.
We should note in passing that it is this common vocabulary rife with ambiguity upon
which, on Neurath’s view, protocol statements are based. Indeed, Neurath speciﬁes that
protocol statements are ‘of medium complexity and uncertainty like those familiar to usese examples come from Neurath (1983c, p. 150). See Cartwright et al. (1996) on the importance of
gen to Neurath’s philosophical views.
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purpose of common language and its Ballungen, for it is this language that is inter-trans-
latable among observers, cultures, and epochs.
2.3. Naturalized epistemology
The ambiguities of common language that are ineliminable from science make neces-
sary the science of science. This ‘behaviouristic study of the actions of men of science’
is necessary if we are to understand the relationships linking scientiﬁc theory to everyday
terminology (ibid., p. 149). Further, the science of science, along with the sociology, his-
tory, and philosophy of science and in general, as Geisteswissenschaften, are legitimate
components of uniﬁed science. Thus there is no privileged perspective from which philos-
ophy can work—it is in amongst all the sciences.
A consequence of this view is a form of naturalized epistemology, that is, the view that
the study of in what knowledge consists, how science proceeds, etc., is an empirical inves-
tigation, indeed part of science itself. Philosophy is replaced by empirical and logical stud-
ies that are themselves part of uniﬁed science. Neurath writes of his and his colleagues’
aims for uniﬁed science that4 See
positioWe would establish the ‘cross connections’ from science to science and thus create a
structure that knows no ‘philosophy’, no ‘epistemology’ with special propositions—
whichever one of these two is applicable has found its place either in the ‘logic of sci-
ence’ or in ‘behaviouristics’. (Neurath, 1983b, p. 115)The a priori disciplines of philosophy and epistemology are thus replaced by a combina-
tion of logic and empirical study of the actual development of science.
This latter component cannot be done in advance, but must take account of what sci-
entists in fact decide. We mentioned above that many diﬀerent systematizations of science
are possible. Which one is pursued is a matter of historical accident—it simply turns out
that we pursue one path or the other. Thus we are ourselves part of the data of uniﬁed
science; our responses and decisions are data determining the form of science (Neurath,
1983c, p. 157). And this is the replacement of a priori epistemology.
Thus Neurath has naturalized epistemology, replacing philosophy with uniﬁed science.
Anything that is ‘isolated’ and thus ‘scientiﬁcally useless’ is merely metaphysical and, it
seems, useless more broadly (Neurath, 1983d, p. 137). In contrast, the science of science
is a worthwhile and promising endeavor. The degree to which it will succeed Neurath,
in characteristic form, leaves as an open question. But the social scientist in him certainly
seems optimistic.4
2.4. Neurath’s brand of physicalism
Just as Neurath’s notion of uniﬁed science is far diﬀerent from the typical reductionistic
picture, so too is his brand of physicalism other than one might at ﬁrst think. However,
after the discussion above, Neurath’s version of physicalism should now seem to fall neatlyUebel (1992, 1996) for a more in-depth examination of Neurath’s naturalized epistemology and his related
n in the protocol sentence debates.
A. Potochnik, A. Yap / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 469–488 479into place. For in his view, physicalism amounts to the idea that the everyday language of
perceptible objects can be used throughout the scientiﬁc enterprise.
We have discussed how all of science is (or should be) uniﬁed and how ordinary lan-
guage is needed to ground science. This systematized language of all science—Neurath
calls it a ‘universal jargon’—is, as we saw above, full of imprecision and ambiguity. It is
important that this universal jargon is used in a consistent manner throughout science
and, further, that the theoretical language that develops is consistent with this jargon. It
is here that physicalism comes in.
In various places, Neurath cashes out what he means by physicalism in slightly diﬀerent
ways. Yet these ways seem consistent with one another.5 Early on, he writes that physical-
ism is the view that ‘what matters is that all statements contain references to the spatio-tem-
poral order, the order we know from physics’ (Neurath, 1983a, p. 54). Thus ‘I see blue’, for
example, is a statement taken to indicate spatio-temporal changes outside of the person or,
if hallucinatory, certain changes within the person herself. Relatedly, Neurath later claims
that physicalism is the practice of using a universal jargon that corresponds to the language
of physics. Here to get at what he means by this correspondence, he points out that index-
ical terms can be replaced by explicit references to place and time. The important aspect of
physicalism thus remains that all statements relate back to the spatio-temporal ordering.
And ﬁnally, in another formulation, Neurath claims that physicalism is the view that ordin-
ary language can be used in all scientiﬁc discussions. The picture of his physicalism perhaps
emerges best here. He begins by discussing again how statements like ‘I see something red
ﬂoating in front of me’ are to be translated into statements with direct references to times,
people, and places. This5 Th
has be
anothe
the vie
depicti[seems] to have the advantage that the ‘when, where and how’ attitude could be
maintained from the bottom to the top. This I call the ‘physicalist’ approach, which
has nothing to do with ‘mechanism’ or anything like that; it only pretends that we
can use the everyday language which we use when we talk of cows and calves
throughout the empiricist discussions. (Neurath, 1983g, p. 233)Uniﬁed science begins with a universal jargon full of Ballungen that is accessible to dif-
ferent people, at diﬀerent times, and in diﬀerent places. This Neurath takes to be possible
because of his version of physicalism: the ability to formulate observations and so on, in
terms of the spatio-temporal framework used in physics. This physicalism ensures the uni-
versality of our jargon and, thus, the possibility of a science uniﬁed across individuals, cul-
tures, and disciplines.3. Neurath and Bauhaus: rethinking the connections
We take Section 2 above to demonstrate the extent to which Neurath’s philosophical
views fail to line up with a program of transparent construction from simples. Indeed,
on our view, the philosophical diﬀerences between Carnap and Neurath are sizable enoughroughout this discussion of Neurath’s philosophy, the issue of how Neurath’s views developed over time
en neglected. We think this is unproblematic, for the success of our thesis will not hinge upon one or
r version of the general views outlined here. Important is only the fact that at no point did Neurath hold
ws that one must ascribe to him in order for the procedural meaning of Aufbau to apply. We take this
on of Neurath’s general philosophical views to illustrate this. See note 8 below for more on this point.
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the Vienna Circle on Carnap’s Aufbau. Yet, at least in ‘Aufbau/Bauhaus’, the idea of Auf-
bau as transparent construction from simple elements is a very signiﬁcant part of the
repository of common vocabulary that Galison takes to be shared by the Bauhaus and
the Vienna Circle. In reality, though, this connection ﬁts Carnap’s early philosophical pro-
jects better than those of Neurath. Here we will argue for this claim, as well as outline
some distinct connections between Neurath and the Bauhaus.3.1. Carnap’s Aufbau and the Bauhaus
First of all, the common themes in the Bauhaus’s architectural work and Carnap’s
philosophical work bear emphasizing. As we discussed in Section 1, Carnap and the Bau-
haus were not merely uniﬁed by their leftist political tendencies. The two also subscribed to
parallel methodological commitments. One of these is a commitment to a form of unity
that springs from the building up of a structure from simple elements. For the Bauhaus,
this commitment meant that structures and ﬁxtures were built up out of a few simple
shapes, with forms and colors limited to the typical (Willett, 1978, p. 119). Thus the sim-
plest elements were combined to produce functional buildings and objects.
Carnap’s commitment to this structural building up from simples is manifested in the
very nature of his project in the Aufbau. In the Preface to the second edition, he states that6 Wh
instanc
interpr
argum
constru
that a
BauhaThe main problem concerns the possibility of the rational reconstruction of the con-
cepts of all ﬁelds of knowledge on the basis of concepts that refer to the immediately
given. (Carnap, 1969, p. v)If the project of the Aufbau succeeds, then, all science will be constructed on the basis of
sense experience. So where the Bauhaus built up structures physically out of simple design
elements, Carnap built up the conceptual structure of experience logically, starting from
immediate perception.
This commitment to the construction of complex ediﬁces from simple elements provides
the occasion for a second parallel between Carnap’s and the Bauhaus’s programs. Both are
committed to a form of transparency in virtue of this construction process. Architectur-
ally, the transparency results from the formulaic combination of simple shapes and colors,
as well as the commitment to structures that diﬀer only insofar as they are to be put to
diﬀerent uses. Recall from above that if spaces were to be used by similar people for sim-
ilar purposes, Gropius saw no reason for them to be distinct. This would be a ‘wasteful
and a misplaced emphasis on individuality’ (Willett, 1978, p. 121).
Through hisAufbau project, Carnap intended to show how scientiﬁc claims can be traced
back to perceptual facts.6 This rational reconstruction allows for its own sort of transpar-
ency, insofar as scientiﬁc claims can then be understood based upon their relationship toether or not the Carnap of the Aufbau is committed to foundationalism is a disputed matter. See, for
e Richardson (1998), Friedman (1999). In our view, Galison (1990, 1996) suggests a foundationalist
etation of the Aufbau. However, he may not be committed to this interpretation of Carnap, and our
ents here do not depend upon such a commitment. Regardless of whether or not Carnap’s transparent
ction from simple elements is taken to be foundationalist in nature, what is at issue here is Galison’s idea
commitment to this philosophical transparent construction unites both Carnap and Neurath to the
us. On our view, it does not.
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that is, all legitimate, non-metaphysical claims about the world. He argues that the relation-
ship obtaining between higher and lower levels of complexity in science is that of logical
complexes and their elements. When a scientiﬁc concept is shown to be merely a logical
complex, it follows that ‘all statements about it can be transformed into statements about
its elements’ (Carnap, 1969, p. 7). Thus this logical construction of scientiﬁc concepts from a
basis in the immediately given makes possible a certain perspicuity in science. For ulti-
mately, if Carnap is right, all scientiﬁc claims derive from—and can be traced back to—sim-
ple claims about sense experience.
3.2. Neurath and Carnap: philosophical diﬀerences
These commonalities between the Bauhaus and Carnap’s Aufbau in particular make
salient some key philosophical diﬀerences between Carnap and Neurath. Neurath would
not have undertaken a quest for transparent logical construction, at least in part because
of his notion of Ballungen. Recall that Ballungen are not only irremovable from science,
but even essential to its success. Ballungen—common, imprecise terms that are somewhat
vague in meaning—ensure that diﬀerent individuals with diﬀerent backgrounds can com-
municate with each other; that observations remain stable with the passing of time; and in
general, that science can be shared among all manner of people, cultures, and times.
The residual ambiguity that accompanies Ballungen makes impossible the Carnapian
ideal of transparency. For Carnap, this transparency stems from the logical construction
of science from immediate sense experience or other basic elements. But in Neurath’s view,
the common words for middle-sized objects are the basis for science, and the very thing
that makes them suitable for this job is that they cannot be deﬁned away, fully cashed
out in more precise terms. Neurath writes:7 SeeThe ﬁction of an ideal language constructed out of pure atomic sentences is no less
metaphysical than the ﬁction of Laplace’s demon. The language of science, with its
ever increasing development of symbolic systems, cannot be regarded as an approx-
imation to such an ideal language. (Neurath, 1959; p. 199)We are stuck with the ambiguities of common language.
The vagueness and ambiguity of Ballungen mean that there are diﬀerent directions in
which science can proceed, diﬀerent ways for theory to accommodate empirical observa-
tions. Recall from Section 2.3 that, for Neurath, the study of science is in part sociological,
a matter of looking to see in what direction scientists have in fact proceeded. This is
because science starts with an ambiguous language that makes crystal-clear, logical pro-
gression impossible. As Neurath said in his famous boat metaphor, ‘we are like sailors
who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able to dismantle it
in dry dock’. And rather than striving for transparency, we should appreciate the impor-
tance of Ballungen, of the ‘conglomerations’ that solidly frame our ship.
Neurath’s position on protocol sentences is, naturally, closely related to his notion of
Ballungen.7 He oﬀers as an example of a protocol sentence the statement, ‘Otto is observing
an angry person’ (Neurath, 1959, p. 199). An essential feature of this statement, and of pro-
tocol sentences in general, is the reference to the person who makes the observation—this isUebel (1992) for an in-depth discussion of this issue.
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Indeed, in Neurath’s view, the above sentence should be even further expanded to incorpo-
rate its time-index. The revised sentence would read something like, ‘At 12:00 p.m. Otto
noted that Otto is observing an angry person’. But even in this more fully speciﬁed version
of the statement, the appeal to the vague concept of ‘angry person’ remains.
The explicit reference to time and observer in Neurath’s version of protocol sentences
serves to emphasize a key aspect of his philosophical position. For Neurath, science is
interpersonal to its core. The immediately given is not the proper foundation for science.
Instead, even protocol sentences are formulated in the third-person, with indexicals
replaced with explicit reference to times, places, and people. Protocol sentences and the
Ballungen comprising them are formulated in a way that ensures that people can under-
stand one another. It is this opportunity for communication that grounds science, not
the individualistic formulation of statements capturing immediate sense experience.
Another signiﬁcant diﬀerence between Neurath and Carnap is in their disparate ideas of
unity of science. We showed in Section 2.1 how Neurath’s vision of uniﬁed science was
exempliﬁed by encyclopedism and the systematization of science, instead of the construc-
tion of a single scientiﬁc system. We are to reject the notion of ‘a philosophical system
which is to legislate for the sciences’ and ‘the rationalistic anticipation of the system of
the sciences’ (Neurath, 1983f, pp. 176–177). Instead, the progression of science itself dem-
onstrates the ways in which it can be uniﬁed. Neurath writes that ‘The whole of science is
basically always under discussion’ (1983b, p. 118). The unity of science is an ongoing task,
not something which can be accomplished once and for all. The crucial role of Ballungen
and the pluralism of the scientiﬁc community make a preordained, constructional system
impossible even in principle. What is more, this pluralism is essential to the anti-totalitar-
ian and fundamentally democratic character of encyclopedism.
Carnap’s notion of unity of science, on the other hand, has much more to do with a sys-
tem thanNeurathian systematization. It is true that Carnap did not commit himself to a sin-
gle basis for science. The system that he constructs in his Aufbau has an ‘autopsychological’
basis, which takes ‘elementary experiences’ as basic elements. Yet Carnap explicitly consid-
ers other bases which could have served to ground the rational reconstruction of the Auf-
bau—some are physical, others psychological (Carnap, 1969, pp. 99–100). Carnap is not
seeking the system of science. Yet in spite of this pluralism regarding the basis of reconstruc-
tion, he still seems to be advocating something akin to a ‘system view’ of the unity of science.
In his view, ‘the formation of the constructional system is the ﬁrst aim of science’ (ibid., p.
288). Now, Carnap means this in a logical, not a temporal sense; he is not suggesting that
science must stop until the foundational project is completed. But he does believe that dem-
onstrating the manner in which an object is constructed out of the basic elements of expe-
rience is what gives statements about that object a veriﬁable meaning (ibid., p. 289). Thus,
even though diﬀerent bases are possible for the constructional system, the (logically) ﬁrst
task of science is to ﬁx one and proceed from there. For ‘by placing the objects of science
in one uniﬁed constructional system, the diﬀerent ‘‘sciences’’ are at the same time recognized
as branches of the one science and are themselves brought into a system’ (ibid., p. 288).
There is no sense in the Aufbau, then, of the unity of science as an ongoing task. In a
way, science actually begins when the system is completed. What gives science unity is uni-
ﬁed language and the resulting ability to translate statements in any domain of science into
the uniﬁed language. This language, the constructional system, and its basic elements
determine what statements are scientiﬁc. They are logically prior to the rest of science.
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single constructional system for science, though we acknowledge that it is not the only pos-
sible one. It thus seems that diversity does not play an essential role in scientiﬁc practice
for Carnap. In contrast to this, Neurath takes diversity to be an essential aspect of scien-
tiﬁc practice:Multiplicity and uncertainty are essential. From the data at our disposal we can, in
more than one way, deduce predictions that are in harmony with science; the multi-
plicity of predicting cannot be excluded by any method; no degree of systematic pro-
cedure can alter this. One can, so to speak, not agree on a ‘machine’ that
unambiguously produces ‘inductions’ in the wider sense. The progress of science con-
sists, as it were, in constantly changing the machine and in advancing on the basis of
new decisions. (Neurath, 1983b, p. 116)Neurath and Carnap both emphasize the importance of the scientiﬁc community and
the role of the encyclopedia project in furthering communication within it. Yet why is plu-
ralism in that community so important for Neurath? Carnap certainly does not oppose it,
but he does not make a case, as Neurath does, for fostering it. The diﬀerence is in the
emphasis of their respective projects. In the Aufbau, at least, the aim is to rationally recon-
struct scientiﬁc claims using sense-experience as a basis. For Neurath, however, we take
science as it is, and science is a social activity. As can be seen from his views on matters
ranging from Ballungen to naturalized epistemology, Neurath is very conscious of the nat-
ure of science as a social practice.
3.3. Neurath/Bauhaus
Thus far in this section we have discussed in more detail the parallels between Carnap’s
philosophical views and the Bauhaus project (Section 3.1) and some central philosophical
diﬀerences between Carnap and Neurath (Section 3.2). From this it is clear that Carnap
and Neurath’s diﬀerences are such that the procedural meaning of Aufbau that is com-
monly held by Carnap and the Bauhaus is not shared by Neurath. In this ﬁnal section,
we will explicitly develop the diﬀerences between Neurath’s philosophical commitments
on the one hand and the commonalities between Carnap and the Bauhaus on the other.
We will then discuss what Neurath does have in common with the Bauhaus. Some of these
connections are also shared with Carnap and other members of the Vienna Circle. Others
are more particular to Neurath.
We have emphasized that Neurath’s conception of the role of Ballungen in science runs
counter to the project of mechanical composition from simple components and to the
transparency that is the aim of this compositionality. Yet these are the method and
aim, respectively, that connect Carnap’s and the Bauhaus’s respective projects. Thus,
whereas the Bauhaus’s commitment to architecture composed of simple components put
together in a mechanical way is mirrored in Carnap’s notion of the unity of science as a
logical reconstruction from the immediately given, this is not so for what Neurath means
by the unity of science. Ballungen are ill-suited for the role of the simple elements of con-
struction. They are not few and known, but various and vague.
It thus seems as if Neurath would not have recognized a project parallel to his for sci-
ence in the mechanistic architecture of the Bauhaus—at least not in the way that Carnap
could have. Neurath’s project of unifying science is not an Aufbau in the sense of a trans-
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such a construction, since for Neurath, we are epistemically always as if on a ship already
at sea. There is no process of building more complex forms from the simple, that is, no
building an ediﬁce that comprises all of science. Uniﬁed science is not an ediﬁce—not a
system—but an ongoing project that arises organically from the directions that scientists
themselves decide to take. For these reasons, rather than a process of construction, Neu-
rath’s notion of uniﬁed science is more like haphazard renovation. We start from our cur-
rent epistemic position, and we are without advance plan or particular end goal.
Relatedly, the commitment to physicalism that Galison takes to unite the Vienna Circle
and the Bauhaus does not line up with Neurath’s notion of physicalism. In Section 1.2, we
mentioned that Galison refers to Neurath’s physicalism as his ‘doctrine of building up
from simple elements of experience’ (Galison, 1990, p. 746), which is aligned with the pro-
cedural meaning of Aufbau. Yet we have argued that characterizing Neurath’s philosoph-
ical project as a process of construction is misleading. Further, the protocol sentences that
serve as the taking-oﬀ points for science are, for Neurath, not ‘the given’, but third-person
intersubjective statements formulated in ordinary language.
For Neurath, physicalism amounts to something like the thesis that everyday lan-
guage—language that refers to perceptible objects—suﬃces for science. Whatever follows
from this thesis, it does not entail that science is built up from the simple elements of expe-
rience. Protocol sentences refer to sensible objects; that much is clear. And it is the Ball-
ungen found in protocol sentences that ground science. But Neurath cashes these claims
out in a way that undermines the very idea of a construction project that starts with imme-
diate experience.8 Thus the connection that Galison draws between the Vienna Circle and
the Bauhaus that centers on the procedural meaning of Aufbau does not ﬁt Neurath’s
philosophical views. Neurath’s philosophical methodology simply does not mirror the
Bauhaus’s architectural methodology. While Neurath may have considered a construction
process leading to transparency of form to be an admirable architectural goal, he certainly
did not see its analog as a warranted philosophical goal.9
However, as was discussed above, the procedural meaning of Aufbau is not all that
Galison has in mind. In ‘Constructing modernism’, he also discusses the emphasis that
both the Vienna Circle and the Bauhaus place on collaboration, which has more to do
with the left-technocratic meaning of Aufbau. This emphasis on collaboration is something8 Galison points out that cultural meanings such as those that he takes to connect the Vienna Circle and the
Bauhaus are artifacts of a particular historical period. So it may be argued that it is unfair to cite Neurath’s later
work as evidence against his engagement with the procedural meaning of Aufbau. Yet in our view, these later
writings only help to clarify a persisting feature of Neurath’s general viewpoint. Neurath was not a proponent of
physicalism as transparent construction from simples in 1928, when Carnap’s Aufbau was written, any more than
he was a decade later. This can be seen from his review of Carnap’s Aufbau (Neurath, 1981), despite the fact that
in this work he emphasizes the points of agreement between him and Carnap. In the review, Neurath remarks that
Carnap deals principally with physics and natural sciences. He suggests that the picture would be more
complicated if Carnap had also considered the social sciences. In particular, Carnap would have had to address
the question of how knowledge can be furthered when science must use both clean (saubere) and unclean
(unsaubere) ways of thinking, a situation which Neurath remarks might be necessary. Such unsaubere Denkweisen
seem quite similar to his Ballungen.
9 The idea of construction from simples undoubtedly resonated with Neurath on another level. His ISOTYPE
was a system of pictorially communicating information without relying upon words. This system relied upon
bringing together in a single picture various representations with which viewers were previously familiar. Thus,
this might be considered to be an instance of construction from simples. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this
point.
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ological values. Though the notion of collaboration is not as central to the Aufbau as the
nature of the constructional system, Neurath does point out in his review of the book that
Carnap emphasizes the collectivistic nature of scientiﬁc research (Neurath, 1981, p. 297).
The importance of collaboration to Neurath’s own encyclopedia project, as well as to
the methods of the Bauhaus, can hardly be overstated. Indeed, collaboration was one of
the most important features of the encyclopedia. This can be seen from its very title, Inter-
national encyclopedia of uniﬁed science. It was to engage scientists from a variety of disci-
plines and a variety of countries, so that the encyclopedia could become a vast survey of
the state of science. Neurath intended it to be ‘the symbol of a developed scientiﬁc coop-
eration, of the unity of the sciences, and of the fraternity between the new encyclopedists’
(Neurath, 1983c, p. 158).
For the Dessau Bauhaus, architecture was also a matter of cooperation. Gropius writes,
‘The art of building is contingent on the coordinated team-work of a band of active col-
laborators whose orchestral cooperation symbolizes the cooperative organism we call soci-
ety’ (Gropius, 1965, p. 57). So even though Neurath’s scientiﬁc unity and the Bauhaus’s
architectural methods diﬀer, they are united insofar as both crucially depend upon the
coordination and cooperation of individuals.
Furthermore, even though Neurath does not think that uniﬁed science is to be brought
about through anAufbau-style constructional system, his ownmethods have somewhat sim-
ilar aims. Galison points out that ‘in both Bauhaus andAufbau, construction from the intel-
ligible simples eliminated the metaphysics of the unnecessary, the merely decorative’
(Galison, 1990, p. 738). Neurath and Carnap are united in advocating the elimination of
that which is merely decorative or metaphysical, and it is their physicalism that assures this
elimination.10 This is closely linked to the Bauhaus’s elimination of the purely decorative.
Perhaps related to their opposition to metaphysical ideas such as a ‘national essence’,
the Bauhaus and the Left Vienna Circle shared similar political inclinations. In Meyer,
we see not only statements about the importance of cooperation,11 but also views about
the international character of his approach to building: ‘The constructivist form knows
no fatherland; it is stateless and the expression of an internationalized way of thought.
Internationalism is one of the virtues of our age’ (Meyer, 1994, p. 448). The encyclopedia
project of the Vienna Circle was explicitly international; its emphasis on collaboration
clearly advocated communication between scientists of all nationalities and was aimed
to eliminate nationalistic bias from science.
Another shared aspect of these groups’ leftist politics was the importance that each
placed on a close relationship between science and modern life. After all, ‘Science and life’
was the title of Carnap’s initial lecture at the Bauhaus, in which he spoke of the roles of
both science and visual art in modern life. Neurath also supported the technologically dri-
ven aspect of the Bauhaus, as well as its use of new synthetic materials in the construction
of their products (Neurath, 1929; Galison 1990). This tying together of modern technology10 Neurath was probably the member of the Vienna Circle most vigilant in his guard against metaphysics.
Metaphysical claims were, for the logical empiricists, meaningless. They served merely to obfuscate matters. In
this sense, then, Neurath was committed to furthering the transparency of language as much as possible.
However, the pursuit of this sort of transparency is wholly distinct from the notion of construction from simples
and, thus, does not align with Galison’s explication of the notion. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing
out how Neurath’s elimination of the metaphysical is a commitment to a particular form of transparency.
11 For instance, ‘Cooperation rules all the world. Community rules over individual being’ (Meyer, 1994, p. 447).
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architects of the time. In Galison’s words:Indeed, the claims for a reformation of life based on modern principles of science
became a common slogan of the left-leaning architects of post-World War I Ger-
many—and an irritant to those on the right, who were determined to preserve a vo¨lk-
isch life form, imbued with history, nationalism, and racial identity. (1990, p. 717)These two parallels—the role of collaboration and leftist political commitments—are
rather general, shared by many progressive thinkers between the wars. Hence the promi-
nence of the left-technocratic meaning of Aufbau. But the ideological connections between
Neurath and the Bauhaus are more extensive. To begin with, Neurath was acutely con-
scious of science as a social practice; a belief shared by Carnap but not as central to his
philosophical views. Neurath makes clear that the elimination of metaphysics is not simply
an end in itself, but is for the sake of science. On his view, metaphysical idealism can lead
to undesirable consequences in science, as well as other social practices. Neurath writes
that metaphysical idealism has allowed for the justiﬁcation of oppressive social practices,
and even the acceptance of totalitarianism. He argues that the Nazis found arguments for
persecution in Plato’s Republic and that Fichte’s idealism caused him to ask for the expul-
sion of the Jews (Neurath, 1983g, p. 238). These reprehensible social practices result from
the adoption of some artiﬁcial authority. The moral that Neurath draws is that no abso-
lute authority should be accepted in science or similar institutions.
In our view, then, the most signiﬁcant intellectual connection between Neurath and the
Bauhaus is not in their methods but in their overarching aims. Neurath’s views about sci-
entiﬁc practice are incompatible with a view of science as a Carnap-style Aufbau. Yet these
methodological diﬀerences are perhaps less important than the shared aims of Neurath’s
and the Bauhaus’s respective projects. In fact, with respect to their broad aims, Neurath
and the Bauhaus architects were engaging in two versions of the same project: each sought
to organize and improve life through science and technology. To place too great an
emphasis on the comparison of their methods would be a mistake. For both Neurath
and the Bauhaus, these methods were clearly subordinate to their overarching social aims.
Neurath’s uniﬁed science is motivated at least in part by its instrumental value. In prac-
tical tasks which involve the sciences, such as architecture or city planning, many diﬀerent
sciences are involved. The eﬀective application of science thus requires the coordination of
its parts. Uniﬁed language and scientiﬁc cross-connections are important insofar as they
are needed for the use of science in the pursuit of practical ends and social goods. Further,
his empiricist philosophy is not designed to take the place of a metaphysical higher author-
ity. Indeed, pluralism in science is meant to ensure that science will remain non-totalitar-
ian. If science itself were to replace the totalitarian metaphysical authorities, something
would certainly be wrong. For without collaboration and democratic cooperation, science
would be ill-suited to beneﬁt society.
Similarly, to focus only on the Bauhaus’s use of technology and non-decorative style
would neglect the goal that this technology was designed to serve. The Bauhaus developed
its doctrine of freeing architecture from excessive ornament because of its inﬂuence on
human life:rationalization, which many people imagine to be [the New Architecture’s] cardinal
principle, is really only its purifying agency. The liberation of architecture from a
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on concise and economical solutions, represent the purely material side of that for-
malizing process on which the practical value of the New Architecture depends. The
other, the aesthetic satisfaction of the human soul, is just as important as the mate-
rial. (Gropius, 1965, pp. 23–24)Not only is the elimination of the decorative and the metaphysical instrumental, but it
seems as though science and technology are as well. The use of technology is not in itself
an end for the Bauhaus, just as the betterment of science is not wholly an end by itself
for Neurath. Gropius is quite explicit about this. He writes that mechanization and other
industrial tools are extremely useful for building but should not be taken to be things
which ought to be pursued independently of the ways in which they can improve life.
For:were mechanization an end in itself it would be an unmitigated calamity, robbing life
of half its fullness and variety by stunting men and women into sub-human, robot-
like automatons . . . But in the last resort mechanization can have only one object: to
abolish the individual’s physical toil of providing himself with the necessities of exis-
tence in order that hand and brain may be set free for some higher order of activity.
(Ibid., p. 33)For the Bauhaus, as for Neurath, method was always subordinate to the ultimate aim of
improving life through science and technology.
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